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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 21-1820
__________
CATHERINE P. FERNANDEZ,
Appellant
v.

BOARD OF PEMBERTON TOWNSHIP;
PEMBERTON TOWNSHIP H.S.
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-20-cv-08600)
District Judge: Honorable Renée M. Bumb
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 23, 2021
Before: MCKEE, SHWARTZ, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 16, 2021)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Catherine Fernandez appeals from an order of the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey, which dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. We will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
Fernandez filed a complaint in July 2020, alleging that the Board of Education of
Pemberton Township and the Pemberton Township High School discriminated and
retaliated against her from September 2005 to 2018, when Fernandez’s daughter was a
student at Pemberton High School. Dkt. #1. The District Court noted that her claims
appeared to be time-barred, as the complaint was filed more than two years after
Fernandez’ daughter graduated in June 2018. Order, Dkt. #2. The District Court also
noted that the complaint failed to comply with Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires a “short and plain statement of the claims” asserted. Id. The
Court gave Fernandez 30 days to amend the complaint, and later granted her additional
time to file an amended complaint. Dkt. #5.
Fernandez’s amended complaint raised federal civil rights claims of discrimination
and retaliation and state law claims against the defendants. Fernandez stated that the
complaint was based on incidents that “happened from 2005 to 2020,” but the complaint
only mentions dates past 2018 in four places: (1) “The defendants hired a lawyer to
express their disregard to the plaintiff until 2020,” Dkt. #7 at 51; (2) “The plaintiff
engaged in a protected activity to intervene to protect her child by reporting injuries,
sexual assault, sexual harassment, and disability harassment against her child from 20052

2020,” id. at 58; (3) “The plaintiff’s disabled child graduated in 2018; however, the
defendants engaged in disregard to the plaintiff through the defendant’s lawyer until
2020,” id.; and (4) “They used an attorney until February 2020 to continue to cause the
plaintiff distress. Where the plaintiff learned in February 2020 the extent her disabled
child’s demoralization and low self-esteem from the defendant’s many years of deliberate
indifference,” which caused Fernandez to have “thoughts of suicide for failing to protect
her disabled child from the defendants,” id. at 60.
The District Court determined that Fernandez’s claims were time-barred and that
equitable tolling of the period of limitations was not warranted. Opinion, Dkt. #12 at 3-4.
The District Court also concluded that the amended complaint did not meet the
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, as the complaint consisted largely of legal conclusions
that were not connected to any conduct by the defendants. Dkt. #12 at 5-6. The District
Court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Id. at
6. The Court also determined that because the claims were time-barred, further leave to
amend would be futile. Id. Fernandez timely appealed.1
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s
sua sponte dismissal of the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) is

1

Fernandez also filed a motion for reconsideration in the District Court. We lack
jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial of that motion, as Fernandez did not
appeal from that order. See Fed. R. App. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii).
3

plenary. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). “We may affirm a
district court for any reason supported by the record.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d
187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011).
We agree with the District Court that Fernandez’s constitutional claims and state
law claims are all governed by a two-year statute of limitations. See Dique v. New Jersey
State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010); Save Camden Public Sch. v. Camden City
Bd. of Educ., 186 A.3d 304, 309 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 2018).
Fernandez argues that the District Court erred in dismissing her suit as untimely
mainly for two reasons.2 First, she argues that the District Court should have applied
equitable tolling to the two-year period of limitations. But we agree with the District
Court that even if Fernandez were having some mental health difficulties during the
limitations period, they did not prevent her from making filings in her daughter’s federal
lawsuit during that period. Second, she argues that the District Court should have applied
a six-year period of limitations that applies to breach-of-contract claims. But even if

2

To the extent that Fernandez argues that any incidents occurred within the period of
limitations, or that some type of continuing violation doctrine should apply to render her
claims timely, we disagree. Fernandez’s vague allegations that the defendants used an
attorney in 2020, or that she discovered the extent of her daughter’s emotional damage
within the period of limitations, cannot state a claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(explaining that a plaintiff’s complaint must contain more than “labels and conclusions”).
4

Fernandez had pleaded a valid, timely, breach-of-contract claim in her amended
complaint (she did not),3 such a claim would arise under state law. Because the only
claims over which the District Court had original jurisdiction—that is, her federal
claims—were time-barred, the District Court could properly decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims that might be timely. See 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3).
We also agree with the District Court that even if the claims were timely,
Fernandez’s amended complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Fernandez did not make any plausible claims that the defendants discriminated against
her or retaliated against her. Fernandez’ amended complaint explained the emotional
distress that she felt because of the way she believed the school treated her and her
daughter. But no allegations support her conclusory statements that the defendants
discriminated against her because of a protected ground or retaliated against her in some
way prohibited by the Constitution or federal statutes. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-80.4
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.5

Fernandez’s conclusory statement that “[t]he defendants breached a Parent-StudentSchool agreement” is not sufficient to state a claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
3

Fernandez also challenges the District Court’s order denying her motion for
appointment of counsel. Because her claims are all time-barred, the District Court did
not abuse its discretion in denying her motion. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153,
155 (3d Cir. 1993).
4

5

Fernandez has filed a motion to extend the time to file a reply brief, App. Dkt. #15, and
5

a motion for appointment of pro bono counsel, App. Dkt. #16. Appointment of counsel is
not warranted, as her claims are time-barred. See Tabron, 6 F.3d at 153. And because
she seeks an extension of time in order for appointed counsel to file a reply brief, we
deny that motion, too.
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